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The Conflict in Aceh, and U.S. Interests in Promoting
A Free Market, Stability and Human Rights in South East Asia
An Examination of the Context and Impacts of
ExxonMobil’s Security Arrangements with the Indonesian Armed Forces
Prepared by Robert Jereski
© June 2001
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Appendix A - 5-14
What ExxonMobil Knows About the History of Abuses
Appendix B - Economic and Political dimensions of
ExxonMobil 15
Corporation's Activities in Aceh
Footnotes 16-22
© Robert Jereski, June 25, 2001
Permission to publish any portion of this report
must be obtained from the author.
"At the root of
instability in Indonesia are not the insurgent movements but rather the
impunity of the Indonesian armed forces which fuels these movements." [1]
On the morning of May 6th, 2001, Zubaida, a 25-year-old
mother, was preparing lunch in Ujung Reuba village. The day was unfolding as it
usually did. But Zuraiba lives in Aceh. Her village is 20 kilometers east of
the industrial city of Lhokseumawe, where ExxonMobil has natural gas
operations. Twenty kilometers was not far enough to insulate her from the
violence of the Indonesian armed forces. On that day, a group of soldiers
assaulted her village. As she was boiling a big pot of water, soldiers stormed
into her bamboo hut. They demanded to know where her husband was. As she
answered, the soldiers tore her four-month-old boy - unnamed according to
Acehnese tradition - from her arms. According to the infant's 15-year-old
sister, Umu Kalsum, "the baby was lying face down." In front of her
mother and Umu, one soldier helped another pour boiling water on him. The baby
died at sunrise the next morning.[2]
Many other children and other innocent villagers continue to be at the mercy of
the brutal Indonesian armed forces. Neither these soldiers nor their commander
has been charged with this brutal crime.
Long-standing grievances by Acehnese against the Indonesian government
emerged in 1998 as widespread revelations of mass graves in the province, one
by a Parliamentary Investigation Commission, forced the Indonesian armed forces
commander, Wiranto, to apologize for past abuses by his soldiers. The United
Nations, the State Department, and international human rights organizations had
reported serious and systematic violations of human rights by the armed forces
of Indonesia since the early 1990s. [see Appendix A for nearly exhaustive
documentation of the history of human rights abuses in Aceh by the Indonesian
military and police.] The revelations provoked a nonviolent civil movement
urging accountability on the part of the Indonesian military. In July 1999,
former Attorney General Marzuki Darusman warned that the imminent referendum in
East Timor "could have an impact in Aceh unless the government gets its
act together in restoring justice [which is] what they want [in Aceh]."[3]
Unfortunately, Darusman's warning went unheeded by the government of Indonesia
and its armed forces. Instead of justice, the Acehnese - and the East Timorese
- calls for justice were met with more repression.
As a result, in Aceh, the call for a referendum has gained widespread
support by the population, which expressed its desires in two massive
demonstrations on November 7, 1999 and November 8-11, 2000. According to
varying sources, between half a million and two million people attended these
demonstrations. According to KONTRAS, The Commission on Disappearances and
Victims of Violence, the Indonesian military and police brutally repressed the
more recent demonstration, resulting in 51 confirmed murders and hundreds of
assaults. The actual number of civilians murdered by security forces is likely
much greater than reported; but access to remote areas where these crimes may
have been committed is restricted by the armed forces.[4]
None other than the current chief of police of Aceh, Chaerul Rasyidi, a
self-proclaimed admirer of Hitler (see footnote 128 of Appendix A), justified
the brutal crackdown by equating those demonstrating nonviolently for a
referendum with armed rebels. He stated, in a Detikworld article on November
15, 2000, that “realistically, the attitude of choosing a referendum is
insurgency.” Recent reports indicate that the deaths from military and police
operations after the fall of Suharto have exceeded deaths from operations under
the dictator’s rule.[5]
Instead of condemning those responsible for crimes against humanity in
Aceh, the Indonesian government has given wider latitude to the main suspects.
As in East Timor, where military officers allegedly responsible for such crimes
have remained in power and even been promoted, Chief Rasyidi remains in charge
in Aceh. Reformers have been sidelined.
The decade-long repressive activities of the Indonesian military and
police and similar repression in East Timor have not muted calls for justice by
Indonesians. And citizens of the United States have joined them. Organs of
civil society in Indonesia and in the United States have called for an
International Tribunal on Crimes Against Humanity committed before and after
the destruction of East Timor in September 1999. The International Forum for
Aceh reiterated its earlier demand for such an International Tribunal, at its
conference in Washington, D.C. in April 2001.[6]
At the same time, it called for an international tribunal that would focus on crimes
against humanity committed in Aceh. As recently as June 6th, 2001,
over thirty human rights and religious organizations wrote to Secretary of
State Colin Powell requesting him to support an International Tribunal for East
Timor. They cited a lack of political will or ability to prosecute the
Indonesian armed forces through the national justice system.[7]
These organizations pointed out that such a tribunal will also “serve as a
strong deterrent to future crimes by the Indonesian military (TNI) throughout
the archipelago.”
Because internal conflicts bleed into neighboring countries and
destabilize them, the root cause of the problems in Aceh must be addressed by
regional governments. This root cause is the impunity of the Indonesian armed
forces, their territorial command structure as well as their economic and
political power, which places them beyond accountability. If these forces
remain above the law, U.S. interests in a free market, regional stability, and
human rights will be undermined. The threat to the rule of law and respect for
human rights, stated U.S. Government foreign policy priorities, is considered
in the Backgrounder below. The constitution of an international tribunal will
further U.S. Government interests.
'Stability' has often been used as a code word for strengthening
authoritarian governments or institutions. But the costs of doing so,
especially in Indonesia today, will have devastating impacts on any promise of
any stability which the U.S. Government can proudly justify to its citizens or
to Indonesians. One predictable result of strengthening the hand of the
Indonesian military by increasing military contacts with the United States will
be an increase in internal conflict, corruption, and human rights violations.
Refugee flows, illicit drug and weapons markets, and trafficking in
persons are endemic to armed internal conflict. The example of Burma provides a
recent and poignant predictor of threats to the national security of S.E. Asia
caused by internal conflicts in neighboring countries. The military
dictatorship in Burma has dramatically impacted Thailand, resulting in a
refugee crisis as well as a massive influx of illicit drugs, such as heroin and
amphetamines, that continues to threaten its national security.
S.E. Asian nations have already felt the corrosive impacts of internal
conflict in Indonesian on their own democratization programs. Such impacts
include the creation of a thriving black market in arms.[8]
A recent opinion piece in the Jakarta Post recognizes that arms trafficking is
a regional problem which must be addressed by ASEAN countries. Dr. Rizal Sukma,
the Director of Studies at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies,
Jakarta, noted that the spread of small arms beyond legal authorities may
originate from the problem within the military establishment of individual
ASEAN countries.[9] However,
economic realities faced by the region's countries will make interdiction
difficult if not impossible. For instance, an estimated 1,000 Thai fishing
boats operate in Indonesian waters.According to the Thai Armed Forces Security
Centre's intelligence unit, some boats can be hired for an illicit arms run for
as little as Baht 50,000 (US$1,100), supply will not be easily stemmed.[10] Existing problems in the nascent
democratization programs of ASEAN countries will be exacerbated by a burgeoning
arms market.
Within the existing regional arrangement dealing with small arms
trafficking, weapons trafficking may be seen as an integral part of broader
transnational crimes -- terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, piracy,
and human trafficking. Incidents of piracy in and near the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore have recently increased at an alarming rate, in both number and
severity. Almost everybody acknowledges that the core of the problem is in
Indonesia, where the general breakdown of order - and an apparent lack of will
and resources to tackle the problem - appear to be the main factors in the rise
of Southeast Asian piracy.[11]
A report of over one hundred “suspected Acehnese rebels” traveling to Malaysia
ostensibly to receive guerilla training underlies the risks to regional
stability of the conflict in Aceh.[12]
Indonesia's lack of political will or capacity to address the demand for
weapons in Aceh must be addressed regionally through support for an
international tribunal, which will dampen support for the insurgents.
In this context, it is critical that Secretary of State Powell urge
ASEAN nations at their annual meeting in Hanoi in July to foster justice by to
act in their own self-interest by calling for an international tribunal on
crimes committed in East Timor. Amnesty International has urged ASEAN countries
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to address “the rapidly deteriorating security and
accompanying human rights violations in Aceh.”[13]
The human rights organization pointed out that the ARF’s has a mandate
justifying this approach. That mandate requires ARF to promote “the enhancement
of political and security cooperation within the region as a means of ensuring
a lasting peace, stability and prosperity for the region and its peoples."
Amnesty International also noted that the Indonesian military’s impunity
impedes this goal.[14]
Instead of focusing on the creation a massive law enforcement architecture to
monitor and intercept the many sources of weapons supply, the U.S. Government
must use a more effective and logical approach by attempting to understand and
address diplomatically the call for justice fueling the demand for weapons.
The U.S. Government may anticipate that the military and police will
resist with terrorist acts to attempts to diminish their role in resolving the
conflict. As they are refused such a
role, they will fear that the next stage of addressing Indonesia’s problems
will be accountability. Credibility in President Abdurahman Wahid’s government
and his initial attempts to curb the influence of the military were undermined
by a series of Christmas bombings for which nine generals are suspects.[15]
More bombings by these forces can be expected on the road to justice.
Nevertheless, accountability is a necessary precursor to the creation of a
stable Indonesia.
On the Acehnese insurgent
side of the conflict, a protracted struggle can be expected. The deep-seated
resentment of Acehnese for the impunity of the armed forces for a litany of
atrocities committed against them, the mass base which the insurgents have been
able to develop, and the ready access to weapons and money they enjoy ensures
insurgent staying power. The internal armed conflict in Aceh is unlikely to
result in a "lasting peace" for reasons cogently reported elsewhere.[16]
A drawn-out conflict will result, however, in the ongoing destabilization of
neighboring countries. Fortunately, however, a protracted struggle may be
avoidable if the military and police are challenged internationally
(regionally) and justice is thereby delivered.
Economic incentives are substantial for the Indonesian armed forces to
maintain their grip on the territories in which they are deployed. Human Rights
Watch reported, in August 1999, evidence that violence surrounding troop
removal in Lhokseumawe, North Aceh, where ExxonMobil is based, was engineered
by Indonesian armed forces "unhappy at leaving lucrative extra budgetary
sources of income, such as illegal logging and marijuana cultivation."[17]
Baihaki Hakim, the President of Pertamina, ExxonMobil’s partner in exploiting
the massive Arun gas field in Aceh has admitted that “it [is] unclear who was
fighting whom in Aceh.”[18]
This statement and evidence presented below indicate that the fighting in Aceh
is in significant part due to a military-police "turf battle."
The military and police raise 75-80% of their operating expenses from
licit and illicit business activities.[19]
Their illicit businesses in Aceh include providing protection, extortion,
drug-running, illegal timber harvesting, illegal fishing, illegal mining, and
prostitution. The police and military are in competition with each other in
their business ventures. As a result of this competition, the military and
police, often in collusion with civilian government officials, have generated
violent disturbances to justify military or police "solutions" to
non-existent threats.[20]
The International Crisis Group reported in September 2000, that "(i)t is
often claimed that military units exploit the opportunities available in
disturbed regions, to supplement their incomes, especially by offering
protection services."[21]
The report found that such claims can not be dismissed out of hand.
Documentation of a "rivalry" between the police and military below
(see Backgrounder Introduction and Appendix A) supports the theory that the
security problems for ExxonMobil are due in large part to causes other than
insurgency threats. Another report by an environmental and social justice
organization found that, in Aceh, there were “ limitless opportunities to
profit financially from this economically fertile region", and reported
that "(t)he elite military Kopassus command, under Suharto's son-in-law
Prabowo Subianto, was thought to control the local marijuana business and, in
one area at least, took control of gold mining."[22]
The ICG also observed, in June 2001, market-distorting influences of the
Indonesian armed forces. It will be useful to quote the ICG's findings at
length: it found that "[t]he military…uses its influence to gain access to
business opportunities for both individual officers and military business
networks. Although public data is naturally not available, it would be most
surprising if there were no military involvement in the many subcontracts let
by companies clustered in the industrial complex at Lhokseumawe [ed. where
ExxonMobil does business]. …The perceived capacity of military personnel to
take retaliatory action in the event of rejection can often be decisive in such
[business] deals."[23]
Further on in its report, the ICG provides a thorough diagnosis of the problem
of doing business in Aceh where there exists a "system" of
"predatory behavior" by the Indonesian military in its business
ventures.[24]
The scope of activities of the Indonesian military and police in legal
and illegal businesses must be investigated in order to assure a smooth
transition from a corporatist economy to a market economy and to guarantee that
U.S. corporations are not breaking U.S. laws against corruption. U.S.
corporations doing business in Aceh (and throughout Indonesia) have a legal
responsibility not to support and profit from the corruption of public
officials there. The military and police involvement in commercial businesses
threatens the operations of a truly free market in Indonesia and the region.
Because 20-25% of their expenses is budgeted, their business activities may be
construed as being subsidized by the government of Indonesia. Furthermore, they
also control large amounts of resources, which allow them to intervene in
politics and in the free market in illegal ways. The police have violently
intervened in labor disputes. The armed forces’ foundations (yayasans)
represent political slush funds for opponents of reform. They also
significantly distort the operations of a free market in Indonesia, as
thoroughly documented in the monograph of Dr. George Aditjondro entitled,
"Chopping the Global Tentacles of the Suharto Oligarchy".[25]
These foundations must be audited.
Special attention must be given to the case of ExxonMobil. The
importance of the company's activities to the national economy of Indonesia
(see Appendix B) and its “cosy”
"business" relationship with the Indonesian armed forces raise flags
about whether this relationship place the company's interests at cross-purposes
with stated foreign policy objectives of the U.S. Government. The military and
police are paid by ExxonMobil to provide security for its operations in Aceh.
The corporation has provided logistical support for the Indonesian military,
which has been barracked at ExxonMobil facilities. Meanwhile, because of the
horrendous human rights record of the Indonesian armed forces, the U.S.
government has distanced itself from those forces through the Leahy law and
other measures.
ExxonMobil may also be undermining the region's stability by financing
military operations, which result in human rights abuses and therefore bolster
support for the insurgents. The insurgents recently asked foreign corporations
to leave Aceh arguing that “"the companies that are in Aceh have become
bases for the TNI (ed. the Indonesian military). We don't have any problem with
companies like Mobil Oil. We just ask the international world to handle the
Aceh problem through law."[26]
In its most recent report on Aceh, the International Crisis Group has
raised the possibility that "[recent] threats delivered to a company [in
the industrial zone where ExxonMobil is operating] originate not from AGAM [ed.
the insurgents] but from elements within the military aiming to raise the level
of 'protection money'."[27]
Despite the corporation’s accommodation of the Indonesian security forces,
ExxonMobil has seen itself targeted by soldiers and police who have shot at its
planes, stolen equipment, and held for ransom some of its workers. ExxonMobil
has been publicly silent about this threat to its security, instead choosing,
again, possibly at cross-purposes with U.S. lawmakers, to continue to support
the armed forces. ExxonMobil’s security has nevertheless provided the
Indonesian military with a much-needed pretext to escalate its operations in
Aceh, resulting in a dramatic escalation in human rights abuses. Financially,
the operations in which ExxonMobil and Pertamina are joint venturers in Aceh
are extremely powerful. They provide 20% to the foreign exports of Indonesia.
The fact that an independent audit by Anderson Consulting of Pertamina, its
partner in Aceh, revealed massive fraud and losses, raises serious questions
about ExxonMobil’s past and continued relationship to its corrupt partner.
A recent report by the British human rights organization, TAPOL,
illustrates the urgency of the situation in Aceh. TAPOL reported, in May, that
a number of mysterious killings on the outskirts of Banda Aceh and in Aceh
Besar district. The victims are people who go out in the evenings for
non-political reasons. According to investigations, the victims are civilians
whose bodies are discovered the following morning. TAPOL’s source provides
figures of casualties (deaths, disappearances, and torture) since the
presidential instruction of 11 April - a total of 192. An Aceh-based NGO, Forum
Peduli HAM, has documented a dramatic increase in civilians killed in Aceh
compared to last year.[28]
The military and police are responsible for numerous well-documented
cases of targeting civilians. Some officials within the U.S. government might
urge the administration to ‘engage’ with the military in order to teach them
about operating without violating human rights.[29]
The track record of U.S. training programs is dismal and the impact of their
renewal at this moment would be to give a green light to the armed forces to
continue its abuses. In any case, the universally condemned practices of the
Indonesian military and police can not be addressed through training. What
soldier needs to be trained to know that “killing a four-month old baby by
pouring boiling water over him, attack[ing] … villagers and looting everything
of value" is not appropriate behavior for soldiers?[30]
The Washington
Post recently warned the Bush Administration that the military showed “no
signs” of embracing democratic norms and that “renewing the once-close U.S.
ties with the Indonesian military…[would represent giving] up on Indonesian
democracy.”[31]
Grotesque actions, such as the one mentioned above, and thousands of
others call for clear condemnation and justice not training. U.S. policy-makers
should be wary, however, of appearing to lead the call for an international
tribunal. The position of the military in Jakarta politics has grown stronger
and there is growing public support for the waging of military operations as
was reflected in an opinion poll recently conducted by Tempo. The Indonesian
government has succeeded in spreading propaganda about the dangers of Acehnese
separatism. U.S. leaders must use diplomacy by urging Indonesia’s neighbors to
recognize their own interests in stability and justice in Indonesia. Such an
approach will avoid recriminations for an ‘interventionist’ foreign policy,
which would, in any case, adequately characterize U.S. support for the
Indonesian military. It is essential to support the peoples of Indonesia as
they build the capacity of their civil society in the face of a reassertion of
military power.
As a major trading partner and as a major source of private and public
foreign investment, the United States and the U.S. business community must
ensure that it does not bolster a radically undemocratic political system in a
strategically sensitive and critical area of the world. Should the
administration be blackmailed by threats that this military and its political
allies, which extort money from U.S. business interests, threaten and beat
journalists, and foment hatred and anti-Christian 'pogroms' in the Moluccas,
will turn to North Korea and Russia for its weapons? The time for reinforcing
the center at all costs must be left behind us. A four-month-old boy is only
one of thousands of innocent victims of Jakarta's military. The U.S. government
is in a position to plant the seeds for a long-term and stable friendship
between the United States and the peoples of the Republic of Indonesia. We must
not turn our backs on the nascent democratic movements which promise to all
Indonesians what we enjoy: the protection of fundamental human rights, a free
press, free and independent unions, a professional military and police under
civilian control which protects citizens rather than "disappearing"
them.
Recommendations to the United States Government:
i. To urge ASEAN countries, at their annual meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam, on
July 23-24, in consideration of their own national stability and their
obligations under relevant human rights conventions and agreements requiring
them to promote security and peace, to support the creation of an International
Tribunal on Crimes Against Humanity committed in East Timor by the Indonesian
armed forces and their militias before and after the referendum there;
ii. To require that military foundations and businesses in partnership,
joint ventures, or contracting with U.S. corporations be audited and shown to
be operating without the use or benefit of coercion or corruption,. Such audits
must assure the United States Government that the businesses of the Indonesian
armed forces are not competing illegally in business ventures.
iii. To pass legislation to make the laundering of money by the Indonesian
military and police more difficult by allowing offshore banking operations to
do business within G-7 countries on condition that these operations comply with
G-7 bank regulations.
iv. To form a Congressional Committee to investigate whether ExxonMobil and
other U.S. corporations are operating at cross purposes with the interests of
the United States Government in promoting stability, human rights and a free
market economy;
-
and
also, specifically, to investigate whether security arrangements of ExxonMobil
and other U.S. corporations doing business in Indonesia comply with basic
obligations of the United States Government in regards to human rights, and
with its stated foreign policy objectives;
-
and
also, specifically, to investigate whether an audit, completed in 1999, by
Anderson Consulting finding widespread corruption in Pertamina, ExxonMobil's
majority shareholding partner in its Arun gas operations, implicates ExxonMobil
as being in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
ON EXXONMOBIL ACTIVITIES
IN NORTH ACEH*
ExxonMobil is
"morally, politically and legally responsible for crimes against humanity
in Aceh"[1]
"Exxon Mobil's
less-than-arm's length detachment from the military must be judged a short-term
gain and a long-term miscalculation"[2]
"Rather than cut
and run from trouble spots, we will work to change them."[3]
- ExxonMobil Op-ed
When
articles in the Winter of 1998, in BusinessWeek and The Boston Globe, reported
that Acehnese non-governmental organizations had accused ExxonMobil Corporation
(then Mobil Oil) of "human rights abuses" in Aceh, Mobil Indonesia
executive vice president, Neil Duffin, responded: "I can frankly say that
we have no knowledge of that happening".[4]
A
former ExxonMobil employee debunked ExxonMobil's claim: “There wasn't a single
person in Aceh who didn't know that massacres were taking place”, says H. Sayed
Mudhahar, a former public relations manager for P.T. Arun. Faisal Putra is an
attorney in Lhokseumawe who intends to sue Mobil on behalf of victims. He
agrees: “The crimes occurred over a long period of time. Mobil Oil cannot utter
the words, `We didn't know'.”[5]
This
backgrounder and the documentation cited in appendix A below demands ExxonMobil
be held to account. A court trying the corporation for crimes against humanity
will not allow it to use the defense of professed ignorance to avoid
responsibility for the predictable impacts of its current security arrangements
with the Indonesian military and police in North Aceh, Indonesia.
The
accusations, which surfaced in 1998, allege that ExxonMobil's wholly owned
subsidiary, Mobil Oil Indonesia (MOI), "provided crucial logistic support
to the army", that buildings and facilities for Post A13 and Rancong,
provided by MOI, were used (by the military) for interrogating and torturing
local people, that the company's excavators were used to dig mass graves for
military victims in the Sentang and Tengkorak hills, and that its roads were
used to bring victims to the mass graves.[6]
So far 14 mass graves have been identified. One is on Pertamina-owned land less
than four kilometers from a Mobil gas-drilling site. Pertamina is ExxonMobil's
production sharing partner in the PT Arun gas operations, in North Aceh
district of the Indonesian province of Aceh.**
Evidence
indicates that ExxonMobil can not credibly pretend it does not know that
security operations undertaken in response to its "security concerns"
will continue and even increase such violations. This evidence may be found in
documents prepared by U.S. government sources, well-respected international
human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch, and in reports of Special Rapporteurs from the office of the UN High
Commission for Human Rights provided below.
This
backgrounder documents that the Indonesian army and police, in North Aceh,
continue to commit systematic human rights violations for which they were
notorious under the dictator Suharto. In fact, human rights violations
throughout Aceh seem to have increased since the informal end of the eight-year
military operations (DOM) in August 1998. The armed forces of Indonesia might
appear to outside observers as a caricature of terror and brutality; but their
impacts on the local populations are deadly.
The
documentation below also helps us to understand the root causes of extreme
violence in Aceh. On March 12, 2001, the government of Abdurrahman Wahid, under
pressure from the military, gave the go-ahead to the Indonesian Armed Forces,
the TNI, to launch a ‘limited security operation’ in Aceh.[7]
Three days before, ExxonMobil, which oversees the operations at the massive
Arun gas fields in Aceh, had announced that it was suspending operations
because of the security situation.[8]
The deployment of thousands of additional troops in Aceh justified on the
pretext of providing security for ExxonMobil means that thousands more troops
are competing to supplement inadequate salaries by taking on non-military work
- some of it legal and some of it illegal.[9]
The official 2000 defense-and-security budget was "according to the
Minister of Defense, only sufficient to cover about 25 per cent of minimal
operating costs."[10]
Any
objective analysis of the reports referred to below must conclude that the
worsening situation is due to an increase in armed operations against insurgents
- the Free Aceh Movement or GAM, which the military claim to be launching to
guarantee the territorial integrity of Indonesia. However, the increase in
offensive operations are in significant measure likely the result of an ongoing
violent rivalry between the military and police for access to lucrative
opportunities in legal and illegal business. These opportunities in Aceh -
especially around the highly profitable gas operations of ExxonMobil, provide
ample incentive to the military and police to avoid withdrawing inorganic
forces from the province. As evidenced by previous calls for security officers
to be held responsible for human rights abuses in Aceh, made following a 1998
withdrawal, such a withdrawal would also likely result in demands for accountability
for atrocities committed in Aceh.[11]
Accountability is something that has yet to effect the military forces
responsible for atrocities in Aceh or East Timor.
The
military and police businesses in Aceh, include providing protection,
extortion, drug-running, illegal timber harvesting, illegal fishing, illegal
mining, and prostitution, are in competition with each other. As a result of
this competition, the military and police, often in collusion with civilian
government officials, have generated violent disturbances to justify military
or police "solutions" to non-existent threats.[12]
The International Crisis Group reported in September 2000, that "(i)t is
often claimed that military units exploit the opportunities available in
disturbed regions, to supplement their incomes, especially by offering
protection services."[13]
The report found that these claims can not be dismissed out of hand and the
documentation of a "rivalry" between the police and military below
supports the theory that the security problems for ExxonMobil are due in large
part to causes other than insurgency threats.
The
shutting down of operations in Aceh has serious repercussions for the Indonesian
economy.*** ExxonMobil has shown that it has the power
to place conditions on the Indonesian government and armed forces before it is
willing to resume operations. Munir, a well-respected human rights lawyer,
observed the effect of the shutdown, stating "
(t)his stopping of production gives the government the perfect excuse to bring
in the military"[14].
Why doesn't ExxonMobil insist on an end to human rights abuses by the
Indonesian armed forces around its facilities as a condition of resuming
operations?
The
security operations have already had predictable lethal results for the local
population. A report dated December 13, 2000, found that villagers from five
villages around Point A of ExxonMobil's operations had complained to ExxonMobil
that violent incidents had increased since the company hired 100 Indonesian
soldiers to guard the point. On May 15, 2001, the Sydney Morning Herald
reported that "troops bashed two Indonesian journalists in front of a
mosque…in North Aceh."[15]
The story went on to detail a recent attack by soldiers who had "killed a
four-month old baby by pouring boiling water over him, attacked other villagers
and looted everything of value."[16]
The United States Agency for International Development cited a report that one
week prior to this incident, "the office of the Aceh chapter of the
national human rights commission in Banda Aceh was shot at…by a group of police
on patrol."[17] The same
week, The Jakarta Post reported that Diswanda Wahyu, a fifteen year old boy,
who had been taken into police custody on Friday, was found dead with (a)
gunshot wound on Saturday".[18]
On April 18th, the Associated Press reported that government forces
killed a five-year old girl and her father, when, according to a witness,
paramilitary policemen "fired blindly".[19]
ExxonMobil:
Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?
The
following documentation raises serious questions about ExxonMobil's culpability
for widespread human rights abuses, committed in the past. Specifically, this
backgrounder seeks to outline the history of human rights violations in Aceh,
in and around the main areas of ExxonMobil's business activities. As a result,
we hope to have illustrated the need for it to review its security arrangements
and to put the corporation on notice for future abuses.
The
documentation referred to in appendices below, all available to ExxonMobil's
executives and their spokespersons, indicates that ExxonMobil has had clear and
compelling evidence available to it, at least since 1992, that serious and
widespread human rights violations by Indonesian security forces were occurring
in Aceh. Furthermore, the sources cited below offer a clear indictment of
ExxonMobil for its "complicity of silence" about the primary cause of
human rights abuses: namely, the Indonesian security forces, a large contingent
of which are hired to provide security to ExxonMobil's operations in the
district of North Aceh. Having silently accepted the pretext for more military
to come to Aceh to provide "security" for its business activities,
ExxonMobil is liable. Because ExxonMobil continues to pay Indonesian military
and police to provide security for its operations, it is doubly liable.
The documents indicate that justified grievances by locals against
ExxonMobil are probably underreported.[20]
The corruption of the Indonesian justice system is well known. In the United
States, where the court system is generally acceptable, the corporation entered
into a costly litigation battle, which resulted in ExxonMobil being found
guilty of "trying to cheat the state out of oil royalties".[21]
Jurors levied punitive fines of $3.4 billion dollars against the corporation
based on internal corporate documents that "indicated Exxon was aware it
was shortchanging the state but thought it had enough muscle to get away
with it".[22] The
documents revealed that the company had "subject(ed) the issue of whether
(to) obey the law to dispassionate cost-benefit analysis".[23]
Similar calculations and use of "muscle" in Aceh are resulting in
atrocities. Under such conditions, Acehnese villagers face one of the most
brutal militaries as well as the world's largest corporation and scofflaw.
Those
activists seeking to bring ExxonMobil towards being a responsible corporate
actor can do the following:
i.
Join the boycott of ExxonMobil being launched
because of its deceptive representations regarding global warming and its
refusal to invest in alternative energy (www.stopesso.com);
ii.
Demand
that ExxonMobil keep its operations in Aceh closed until they take steps - such
as those outlined in the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights - to minimize the risk of continued
violation of the fundamental human rights of the inhabitants of Aceh by the
armed forces it hires to provide security;
iii.
Demand
that ExxonMobil publicly inform the Indonesian government that continuation
ExxonMobil operations are subject to community consultation and approval in an
environment free of coercion;
iv.
Demand
that ExxonMobil acknowledge publicly that its security concerns include the
security of the inhabitants of Aceh and their human rights, who suffer from the
offensive military and police patrols carried out from ExxonMobil supplied
facilities and bases;
v.
Demand
that, in situations of armed conflict, where no non-coercive consultation is
possible with the local population, ExxonMobil end any and all oil or gas
exploration or extraction;
vi.
Demand
that ExxonMobil accept the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights,
to which Unocal, Shell, Chevron, Texaco, Rio Tinto, Freeport MacMoran are
signatories, and develop a Code of Conduct which integrates human rights and
humanitarian law into ExxonMobil's business policies and practices;
vii.
Demand
that ExxonMobil support the International Right To Know legislation proposed by
the International Right to Know Campaign.
For
more information, please contact Robert Jereski, Executive Director of the
International Forum for Aceh, at (212) 973-1782 or through e-mail at
ifaem@yahoo.com
Appendix A - What
ExxonMobil Knows About the History of Abuses by the Indonesian Armed Forces in
Aceh
-
U.S. Government: State Department:
- Announced, in
February 2001, that there were credible reports of "53 cases of forced
disappearance involving 69 persons had occurred between January 1 and the end
of November."[24]
- Found that
"(p)olice and army personnel also routinely respond to attacks on soldiers
by engaging in indiscriminate violence against bystanders"[25]
- Reported, in
February 2001, "numerous credible reports that the army and police
continued routinely to torture detainees in Aceh. For example, on August 27,
police detained three local workers of the international NGO Oxfam, and beat
them while they were detained. According to Amnesty International, police
pulled out one worker's fingernails and burned him with cigarettes."[26]
- Reported that, in
North Aceh, where ExxonMobil is based, "a group of armed men in army
fatigues raped 4 women and sexually molested 12 others; they also beat severely
6 men and robbed their families; no persons had been charged by year's
end."[27]
- Found, in February
2001, that "(t)here are numerous instances of the use of intimidation,
sometimes by the military, and often by hired "thugs," to acquire
land for development projects, particularly in areas claimed by indigenous
people" and that "(s)uch intimidation has been used in Aceh."[28]
- Found, in 2001, that
the "armed forces (TNI) are… not fully accountable to civilian
authority."[29]
- Found that "the
overall human rights situation worsened during the year"[30]
- Reported, in
February 2001, " Security forces were responsible for numerous instances
of, at times indiscriminate, shooting of civilians, torture, rape, beatings and
other abuse, and arbitrary detention in Aceh"[31]
- Found " the
disappearance of dozens of civilians, including Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, a
nongovernmental organization (NGO) activist, and Tengku Hashiruddin Daud, an
Acehnese Member of Parliament."[32]
- Reported, in 2001,
that "(s)ecurity forces systematically employed arbitrary arrest and
detention without trial in Aceh."[33]
- Reported, in 2001,
"(r)apes and sexual exploitation by security forces continued to be a
problem"
- Reported, in 2001,
"journalists continued to suffer intimidation and assaults."
- Reported, in 2001,
"the judiciary remains subordinate to the executive, suffers from
corruption, and does not always ensure due process."
- Found in February
2001 "(i)n Aceh army and police personnel committed many extrajudicial
killings and used excessive force or directed force against noncombatants"[34]
- Reported, in 1994,
that "(i)n Indonesia, extrajudicial arrests and detentions, as well as
torture of those in custody, continued."[35]
- Reported, in 1997, that "(t)he
Government continued to commit serious human rights abuses."[36]
- Stated that
"reports of extrajudicial killings--including killings of unarmed
civilians, disappearances, and torture and mistreatment of detainees by
security forces continued."[37]
- Found that, in
provinces of Indonesia where separatist movements exist, "legal
protections against torture are inadequate, and security forces continued to
torture and mistreat detainees"[38]
- Found, in 1998,
"numerous instances of the use of intimidation, sometimes by the military,
and often by hired 'thugs' to acquire land for development projects"
including instances in Aceh.[39]
- Reported that
"residents living in an area needed for a new cement factory in Aceh were
paid less than the equivalent of 20 cents per square meter of land, which they
felt was inadequate compensation."[40]
- Reported, in 1999,
that "(s)erious human rights abuses in Aceh continued through
May,…including political and other extrajudicial killing "[41]
- Reported that
"(throughout Indonesia s)ecurity forces also were responsible for numerous
instances of indiscriminate shooting of civilians, torture, rape, beatings and
other abuse, and arbitrary detention"[42]
- Stated that
preliminary findings of the National Human Rights Commission "reported
1,010 incidents of torture in North Aceh between1989 and 1998."[43]
- Found that
"(i)n Aceh there were credible reports of mass graves and killings carried
out by security forces in the past and into 1998."[44]
- Reported National
Human Rights Commission findings that "'well organized group' had carried
out the disappearances of…student and NGO activists, and concluded that there
were strong indications that 'elements' of the security forces were involved."[45]
- Reported on a
military investigation of the above-mentioned 'disappearances' which found that
"special forces personnel were involved in the disappearances but claimed
that this resulted from 'procedural errors' and excesses in violation of the law."[46]
- Reported, in 1999,
that "despite admitting his involvement in the abduction of the nine
activists who reappeared, General Prabowo (in charge of military operations in
Aceh) was discharged honorably from the military, and as of year's end no legal
action had been taken against him."[47]
- Found that
"(i)n Aceh the military forces and national police committed numerous
extrajudicial killings and used excessive force to quell separatist
movements."[48]
- Reported that
"(m)ilitary forces…resorted to force in order to disrupt peaceful
demonstrations."[49]
- Found, in 1999,
"credible reports of the disappearance of dozens of civilians"[50]
- Reported, in 1999,
that "(h)uman rights monitors, both international and locally based,
reported that the military continued routinely to torture detainees in Aceh.
Methods of torture documented in the past included beating, whipping, electric
shock, and rape."[51]
- Reported that
"(o)n January 3, TNI forces shot and killed 5 civilians and wounded 25
others in a raid on Kandang village, just outside of Lhokseumawe [ed. near
where ExxonMobil is based]."[52]
- Reported that
"(i)n February in Aceh military troops opened fire on a crowd of several
thousands persons after issuing an order for them to disperse"[53]
- Found that
"(o)n May 3, troops opened fire on unarmed demonstrators in Krueng Geukeh,
north of Lhokseumawe, Aceh, killing at least 40 persons and wounding over 100
more. Many of the dead and wounded persons were shot in the back."[54]
- Stated that
"(o)n July 23 to 24, the military killed at least 50 Acehnese civilians in
the area around Beutong Ateuh, West Aceh. Military spokesmen claimed that the
deaths were the result of an exchange of fire between the troops and armed
separatist rebels, although no military personnel were injured. Credible human
rights monitors described the incident as an unprovoked massacre of unarmed
civilians."[55]
- Reported that
"(i)n February security forces in Aceh detained a 7-month-old baby,
Muhammad Ardiansyah, of Morong village, along with his mother Ainsyah. Ainsyah
alleged that her captors suspended her baby by his legs and left him in the sun
for several hours."[56]
II. United States Government:
Congress
- Made findings in May
2001, based on "supporting documentation from the United States Department
of State and other reliable sources "that the Indonesian armed forces have
committed "widespread acts of torture, rape, disappearance and
extra-judicial executions against…Acehnese civilians."[57]
- Expressed "deep
concern over ongoing human rights violations" committed by the Indonesian
armed forces against civilians in Aceh"[58]
- Found that
"Indonesian armed forces have announced that they are initiating 'limited
military operations' in Aceh, where the Exxon-Mobil gas company has suspended
operations due to security concerns"[59]
III. United Nation High Commission for
Human Rights
- Observed, through
its experts, a "pattern of serious human rights violations" in Aceh
including torture, extrajudicial executions of civilians, and death threats
against human rights organizations personnel and called for investigation and
prosecution of the crimes.[60]
- Reported, based on
the visit in 1998 of U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women Radhika
Coomaraswamy, "that rape and sexual violence had been 'used quite
extensively' by sections of the military as 'a means of intimidation and
torture' during the Soeharto era."[61]
- Reported, based on
its Special Rapporteur On Torture, that "torture is said to be practiced
rather routinely"[62]
IV.
TAPOL (The Indonesian Human Rights Campaign)
- Observed, as of
February 2000, the "marked increase in the use of (intimidation, torture,
disappearances and murder) by members of the security forces against civilian
activists and civilians in general" resulting from the implementation of a
new police operation called OSRIII[63]
- Observed that, by
March 2000, Indonesian President Wahid is "bereft of any control over the
security forces and their operations in Aceh."[64]
- Reported that, since
1980, there had been a "systematic use of state violence in (Aceh)"[65]
- Referred to reports
of 39,000 widows resulting from that violence[66]
- Noted that since the
lifting of Aceh's status as a Military Operational area (DOM) in August, 1989,
"violence in Aceh (had) steadily intensified"[67]
- Noted the findings
of a recent parliamentary investigation team, formed in July, 1998, which
reported the discovery of 12 mass graves, all within the industrialized
districts of North Aceh, Pidie, and East Aceh.[68]
- Noted that the chief
of the Armed Forces, General Wiranto, declared that DOM was withdrawn in
August, 1998[69]
- Observed that, as a
result of its official withdrawal from Aceh "the military needed the
threat of GAM (the insurgent group) to 'justify' its continued presence and
operations in Aceh[70]
- Noted the apparent
admission of extra-judicial execution by then Chief of Police,
Brigadier-General Bachrumsyah Kasman, that of the 157 'terrorists' captured by
security forces between May and December 1999, 77 had died and 12 had been
injured[71]
- Found that the
military launched a series of operations amounting to a) Intimidation, b) Overt
massacres, c) War of attrition - the return to 'shock therapy' (see Amnesty International,
below) and d) Targeting of civilian activists.[72]
- Reported evidence
"that the ensuing violence was initiated and encouraged by members of the
local security forces, in order to associate civilian unrest and instability in
Aceh with the withdrawal of the troops"[73]
- Observed that, on
January 3, 1999, eyewitnesses in Pusong village near Lhokseumawe, reported 40
unarmed civilians were killed by "soldiers…shooting at fleeing
civilians."[74]
- Observed that, on
January 6, 1999, "27 (civilians) were hospitalized, four of whom
died" when "in one of the worst ever recorded cases of clearly
premeditated extra-judicial executions", fifty or more soldiers raided the
KNPI building in North Aceh, near Lhokseumawe[75]
- Reported that, on
May 3, 1999, at least 46 unarmed civilians were killed, 156 gunshot wounds were
inflicted, and ten people were 'disappeared' by members of Air Defense
Artillery 001 and 113 battalions in Simpang KKA, North Aceh.[76]
- Reported that, on
May 25, 1999, five women and children were "shot dead in their
vehicle" by special police unit (PPRM) when the vehicle's tire blew out in
Alue Nireh, North Aceh[77]
- Noted that 5 student
activists from FARMIDIA (Student Movement for Reform) were detained and beaten
by members of the security forces as they returned from a meeting with
officials at PT Arun (owned 30% by ExxonMobil), in Lhokseumawe[78]
- Observed that in
January and February 2000, there was a "sharp increase in the number
of…bodies being found on the roadside" as well as "a spate" of
recently dug mass graves, some near the ExxonMobil pipeline[79]
V.
Human Rights Watch
- Reported, in 2001,
"widespread" violations of human rights in Indonesia[80]
- Reported, with
Amnesty International, that, as of December 8, 2000, "(i)n Aceh, the
systematic targeting of activists by security forces has been underway for
months"[81]
- Condemned the
assassination of three human rights monitors under circumstances which
suggested "deliberate targeting of human rights defenders by the
Indonesian security forces", noted that "(t)he military has made it
clear for some time that they want the dialogue stopped and killing members of
the monitoring team is one way to do it."[82]
- Noted that
"hardliners in the military and government continue to impede efforts to
do justice for past atrocities" and that "reports of new atrocities
continue to emerge, particularly against civilians in conflict zones."[83]
- Reported after the
execution of three humanitarian workers, blamed by the Indonesian police on the
insurgent group, Aceh Merdeka Movement, known as 'GAM', that "(t)he
Indonesia government is allowing its security forces to target humanitarian
workers in Aceh, just as it allowed militias to target such workers in West
Timor."[84]
- Observed "a
notable increase in the targeting of human rights defenders, humanitarian
workers, and political activists in recent weeks -- the Police Mobile Brigade
(Brimob) in particular have been implicated in many of the latest
violations."[85]
- Recognized, in May
2000, the predictable effect of counterinsurgency operations, warned that
" (c)ounterinsurgency operations, however, have relied heavily on
roadblocks and brutal house-to-house searches often accompanied by
indiscriminate violence against unarmed civilians. Hundreds have been
killed."[86]
- Reported that "
GAM abuses are real, and no one should romanticize the movement. But those
abuses pale beside Indonesian army and police excesses [87]
- Outlined, in August
1999, cases of torture, "disappearance", extra-judicial execution,
between August 1998-April 1999, by the Indonesian armed forces in ExxonMobil's
base, Lhokseumawe, which local sources indicated were due to the fact that
"relations between the police and the military were very bad"[88]
- Reported, in August
1999, evidence that violence surrounding troop removal in Lhokseumawe, North
Aceh, where ExxonMobil is based, was engineered by Indonesian armed forces
"unhappy at leaving lucrative extra budgetary sources of income, such as
illegal logging and marijuana cultivation."[89]
- Reported that
"(o)ne result of (military control of operations), … had implications for
some of the violence later on, (namely, an ongoing) legacy of bad blood between
the police and army."[90]
- Warned, in August,
1999, that new military operations and increased troop deployment, "is
likely to mean disaster for ordinary Acehnese."[91]
- Reported that,
"(w)hile army, police, and GAM were all responsible for abuses, including
extrajudicial executions of civilians, the violations were disproportionately
on the government side."[92]
- Found that
"(i)n Aceh, Papua, and the Moluccas, human rights defenders operated at
great risk. The worst conditions were in Aceh, where assassinations were
commonplace and perpetrators seldom identified. On January 31, Sukardi, a
volunteer with the Bamboo Thicket Institute (Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia), a
local environmental and human rights group based in Aceh,
"disappeared"; his naked and bullet-riddled corpse was found on
February[93]
- Dozens of other
activists and local humanitarian aid workers were beaten and threatened,
apparently because security forces suspected them of supporting the rebels.[94]
VI.
Amnesty International
- Noted, on May 17,
2000, the Indonesian government's failure to prosecute commanding officers, in
the only trials for serious human rights abuses committed in Aceh.[95]
- Noted its earlier
warning against deployment of more Indonesian military to Aceh and called for
an end to the then "recent dramatic escalation in human rights violations
in Aceh"[96]
- Reported that, as of
September, 2000, killings, 'disappearances' and
arbitrary detention are "widespread."[97]
- Found
that "(r)isks to human rights defenders and humanitarian workers are due
to the security forces being permitted to act "outside the rule of
law"[98]
-
Reported, in November 2000, many acts of activists being
detained without charge, tortured or killed.[99]
- Noted,
in February 2001, increasing similarities between the current government and
that of the dictator Suharto, in the continuing "(commission)
of serious violations, including unlawful killings, torture and arbitrary
detentions in (Aceh)".[100]
- Expressed concern
with the resurrection of "trials of political activists", notably
Mohammad Nazar of the non-violent activist organization, SIRA, whom AI
recognized as a "prisoner of conscience".[101]
- Observed that
"for ten years, the Indonesian security forces have killed with impunity
in Aceh" and called for an immediate halt to serious human rights
violations.[102]
- Noted "the
continued lack of accountability for security force members and insist(ed) that
rapid progress (be) made on investigating past cases.[103]
- Noted that "the
hundreds of unlawful killings and ''disappearances'' which took place during
(the) years (of the military operation) left thousands of children orphaned or
with only one parent and claimed that similar repression continues
"today"[104]
- Reported, May 2000,
serious abuses, including "widespread violations that have taken place in
Aceh since 1989"[105]
- Noted, in 1993, that
"the worst killings in Aceh, the methods and techniques employed, and the
public comments made by military officers in the region, suggest strongly that
extrajudicial execution (were) part of a deliberate and coordinated
counter-insurgency strategy"[106]
- Found that
"(m)ost of the victims have been ordinary villagers living in areas of
suspected rebel activity, including Aceh Utara (North Aceh)"[107]
- Reported, based on
its Special Rapporteur On Torture, that "torture is said to be practiced
rather routinely"[108]
- Observed
"political killing may be a central aspect of Indonesian Government
policy."[109]
- Quoted a human
rights lawyer who had visited Aceh between October and November 1990 as saying
"(i)t's got to the point where villagers say they are bored of having to
bury bodies they fish out of the river. It happens pretty much every day in
some areas."[110]
- Quoted a report that
"a group of 56 detainees, being transported from the Kopassus camp at
Rancong, were summarily executed by Indonesian troops on 12 September 1990 at
Bukit Panglima, about 27 kilometers along the road from Bireuen, (North) Aceh"[111]
- Quoted a military
spokesperson who dismissed reports of hundreds of "mysterious killings and
"claimed that 'only 20 or 30' corpses had been found, in spite of clear
evidence that the number was far greater."[112]
- Reported that
"(t)hose principally responsible for the torture of Acehnese political
detainees have been military officials, sometimes high ranking officers."[113]
- Found that
"(i)ncidents of torture and ill-treatment are reported to have taken place
at virtually every level of the military command structure, and in dozens of
different security force installations."[114]
- Found these
incidents to be "concentrated in the districts of Pidie, (North) Aceh and
Aceh Timur"[115]
- Listed (in 1993) the
following centers of torture - [ed. near or at ExxonMobil facilities]: Kopassus
Camp, Kreung Geukeuh, Rancong, North Aceh as well as Resort Military Command
(Korem/011) in Lhokseumawe, North Aceh and District Military Command (Kodim) in
Lhokseumawe, North Aceh[116]
- Reported that
"Drs Ismail bin Gani, a father of four and a civil servant at the office
of the Regent of Pidie was arrested and tortured by military authorities in
March 1992 and held incommunicado for two months at the Kopassus headquarters
in Rancong. He was reportedly tortured to extract a confession."[117]
- Found that
"(r)esidents of Buloh Blang Arah told a national human rights organization
that scores of people from Sidomulyo, Kota Makmur, (North) Aceh, were killed
and dumped into a mass grave. They said the victims were made to stand at the
edge of a steep ravine and then shot. The bodies reportedly fell into the
ravine and were then covered over with earthmoving equipment."[118]
VII.
Kontras-Aceh (Commission for Disappearances and
Victims of Violence in Aceh)
- Reported that
"ExxonMobil spent Rp 5 billion (around $530,000) per month on security
forces" including payments to at least 17 military and police stations
with a total of 1,000 personnel financed by the company[119]
- Stated that
ExxonMobil was "morally, politically and legally responsible for crimes
against humanity in Aceh"[120]
VIII. Down To Earth, International Campaign
for Ecological Justice in Indonesia
- Citing what appeared
as "limitless opportunities to profit financially from this economically
fertile region", reported that "(t)he elite military Kopassus command
(in Aceh), under Suharto's son-in-law Prabowo Subianto, was thought to control
the local marijuana business and, in one area at least, took control of gold
mining."[121]
- Reported that
"(i)n October (2000) there were reports of an exchange of fire between
military (TNI) and mobile brigade police (Brimob) personnel, when Brimob tried
to stop and confiscate logs from a TNI truck.[122]
IX. Project Underground
- Reported that "(f)our inhabitants of Desa Ampeh, in North Aceh, on the
Indonesian island of Sumatra are suing Mobil Indonesia for 10 billion rupiah
(US$1.33 million) for taking their land and for taking over a cemetery to use
as an airfield at P.T. Arun"[123]
- Reported
that a local farmer, Yusuf Kasim, was payed "US$4 a night to stand guard
over a borrowed excavator to prevent anyone from siphoning fuel from its
tank"[124]
- Reported
that ExxonMobil operations "have devastated local communities who depend
on agriculture and fish farming, through forced relocations, numerous oil and
industrial spills into the rivers, sea and bay, erosion of their riverside
gardens, and extreme noise pollution"[125]
X.
Press Accounts:
a)
The Jakarta Post
- Reported that "top government
officials have said that retired TNI officers loyal to former president
Soeharto were involved in the bombings" of churches around Christmas[126]
-
Opined, on March 24, 2001, that "(it is) still find it hard to believe that the Free Aceh
Movement members are alone responsible for the security problems. We don't
think they are so stupid as to go as far as killing the goose that lays the
golden egg for their future prosperity. [127]
-
Reported, on May 6, 2001, that Police
Chief of Aceh [ed. a self-avowed admirer of Hitler[128]]
was accused by the Chairman of Human Rights Coalition NGO of being personally
responsible for the murder, while in police custody, of a 15-year old boy,
Diswanda Wahyu[129]
b) BusinessWeek
- Reported that a
local NGO had accused Mobil Oil Indonesia [ed. now a wholly-owned subsidiary of
ExxonMobil] of "(providing) crucial logistic support to the army,
including earth-moving equipment that was used to dig mass graves"[130]
- Reported that a
local NGO alleged "a local Mobil employee…(had been) seize(d)…on company
property without a warrant (and) that the employee has not been seen since.[131]
- Reported that Mobil
"flatly den(ied) allegations that (it) knew of any human rights abuses in
the Aceh area in the early 1990s.[132]
- Found that "one
(mass) grave is on Pertamina-owned land…less than three miles from a Mobil
gas-drilling site."[133]
- Reported "other
suspected graves in close proximity to Mobil operations, such as (those at)
Rancong"[134]
- Reported that
"two contractors say they told local Mobil managers that they had found
human body parts close to Mobil sites"[135]
- Cited a former Mobil
employee as claiming "rumors of massacres and of reports that Mobil
equipment was being used to dig graves were frequently discussed at workplaces
and in a company cafeteria."[136]
- Cited Mobil managers
as insisting that they had "no record of the army using (its help for
anything but peaceful purposes."[137]
- Quoted Mobil
Chairman Lucio A. Noto as saying "(i)f anything happened because somebody
used the equipment in a wrong way, I'm sorry about that."[138]
- Provided a history
of resentment of locals over the hiring of non-locals by Mobil
- Described an
increase in violent clashes that resulted in the eventual large increase, in
1990, in Indonesian military, including the "feared Army Special Forces
[ed. Kopassus]"[139]
- Described the
provision of logistical support in the form of housing and other buildings,
including Rancong, on PT Arun land and Post A-13 at Mobil's Arun gas field.[140]
- Described how the
arrival of a large military presence around Mobil's facilities soon provided
evidence of "the military's gruesome handiwork…strewn everywhere."[141]
- Reported a Mobil
contractor claims to have informed a Mobil manager that along a road leading to
a Mobil oil well known as D2, he had found "pigs feeding…on human bones…in
what appeared to be a bulldozed pit"[142]
- Reported a Mobil
contractor claims to have informed a Mobil manager that the army had
"rounded up and executed Acehnese villagers"[143]
- Reported another
Mobil contractor claims to have informed a Mobil heavy-equipment supervisor
that he had discovered a severed human leg, while testing soil samples for
Mobil[144]
- Described one area
which was known by locals as "Skull Hill" because it had a
"stench of rotting human flesh…(that) could be smelled half a mile
away". And reported that it had been acquired by Pertamina for Mobil to
develop and had been crossed by a road traveled daily by Mobil employees
between 1990 and 1991.[145]
- Cited a former
employee from Mobil's planning department who claimed that Mobil used its
equipment to widen a road through the village of Bukit Sentang, in 1991, where,
in 1990 and 1991 massacres occurred[146]
- Cited a farmer,
Yusuf Kasim, paid $4 a night by the army to stand guard over an excavator, who
testified that he "watched soldiers execute 60 to 70 blindfolded Acehnese
men at a time with M-16 rifles, shooting them in the back so they tumbled
face-first into a mass grave[147]
- Cited evidence that
T. Abdullah Baharuddin, a Mobil employee, who was taken from the office of
Mobil's production department by an army officer, who had "asked
permission from Baharuddin's superiors" on July 10, 1990. His widow
complained to Mobil's public relations manager and over a year later, received
a letter stating that Baharuddin's "employment had been terminated"
and provided for "severance pay 'in line with existing company
policy'" of $3,500 [148]
c) Bloomberg
- Claimed that "Exxon
Mobil's less-than-arm's length detachment from the military must be judged a
short-term gain and a long-term miscalculation"[149]
- Finding that
"Exxon Mobil, by all accounts, became far too cozy with the Indonesian
military during the Suharto years[150]
- Noted that "the
(ExxonMobil) plant's record is speckled with the kind of environmental messes
American corporations get away with in the Third World far easier than they do
in the first."[151]
- Reported that the
"unrest" in Aceh is "obviously strengthening those elements that
want to reclaim the army's place in the national polity"[152]
- Stating that
"the reality (of politics in Indonesia) supports the widely held suspicion
that elements of the army…are at least partly behind the violence directed at
Exxon's plant and personnel"[153]
d) The Wall Street Journal
- Reported, in
September 2000, that "the same military accused of atrocities against the
rebel movement and local population provides Mobil with security services"[154]
- Quoted "(a)
spokesman for the Indonesian armed forces, Graito Usodo, confirmed…that troops
in the area had been involved in "excesses," and that it was
conceivable some may have occurred at A-13 'and at other camps in the
area.'"[155]
- Reported, through
its Asia edition (AE), that "Mobil's contract obliges it to rely on the
Indonesian military for on-site security -- the same military that has been
implicated in a string of high-profile human-rights abuses in its decade-long
campaign against GAM"[156]
- Reported, in AE,
that "human-rights and legal-aid groups in Lhokseumawe say they have
received numerous reports of abuses by troops in and around Mobil
facilities."[157]
- Reported, in AE,
that "[villagers] suspected of being GAM were brought (to) and
tortured" in Post A-13 - barracks across from a Mobil gas well, which
Mobil claimed was in the control of the Indonesian military"[158]
viii.
The Washington Post
-
Printed the editorial of a senior policy analyst
for the International Crisis Group, on December 27, 2001, which condemned the
"plain and brutal political assassination" of three humanitarian
volunteers by the Indonesian police[159]
- Mentioned that the
Indonesian police blamed this well-documented execution on the Free Aceh
Movement[160]
g) Associated Press
- Quoted the Chairman
of the local chapter of Indonesia Legal Aid, referring to ExxonMobil's
knowledge of abuses during military operations period (1990-1998) stating that
"(ExxonMobil) have helped since the beginning of the operation"[161]
- Cited critics claims
that " Mobil provided camps, electricity, communications and other
facilities to the armed forces at a time when it was widely known that a
military campaign was under way"[162]
- Reported that
"(p)olice said restless soldiers shot at and hit a commuter plane
chartered by ExxonMobil" and quoted a regional military chief as denying
this and blaming the incident on the Free Aceh Movement.[163]
h) Petromindo
- Quoted a villager living near ExxonMobil
facilities in Lhoksukon as claiming that "(t)he waste management made by
the company is very bad. The pollution caused by the company have worried
thousands of people"[164]
- Quoted villagers as
claiming "ExxonMobil which produces gas for the Arun natural gas
liquefaction plant has brought more harm than benefits to the local
people"[165]
Appendix B - Economic
and Political dimensions of ExxonMobil Corporation's Activities in Aceh
EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION
Market Capitalization,
Year 2001: $285 billion[166]
ExxonMobil's Revenues
for 2000: $210 billion[167]
Cash reserves
currently held by ExxonMobil: $10.9 billion[168]
INDONESIA
OPEC
member and the largest natural gas exporter in the world
Indonesia's Oil and
Gas Export Revenues as percentage of GDP estimated in 2000: 30%[169]
Indonesia's Gas
Revenues for the last decade: $40 billion[170]
EXXONMOBIL IN ACEH
Province of Aceh's
contribution to Indonesian position as largest liquid natural gas (NLG)
producer: ExxonMobil's PT Arun facilities in Aceh were considered "the
jewel in the company's crown"[171]
ExxonMobil describes
its relationship to the dictator, Suharto: "From the very beginning, Mobil
and the government of Indonesia partnered for mutual benefit."[172]
ExxonMobil promises
that it will "work to change (conditions in trouble spots)"[173]
Province of Aceh
contribution to Indonesia's LNG as percentage of total revenues in 2000: 40%[174]
Contribution
of Aceh operation to the global natural-gas output of ExxonMobil: 7%[175]
Contribution of Aceh
LNG operation to ExxonMobil revenue in 2000: $1.7 billion.[176]
Average
annual contribution to net income for ExxonMobil: $300 million and $500 million[177]
Percentage
of 2000 earnings for ExxonMobil from Aceh operations: 2.8% of the $17.7 billion[178]
Arun Field potential
future earnings for ExxonMobil: Contracts to provide NLG good through 2018[179]
Major customers: Japan
and South Korea[180]
HISTORY OF OPERATIONS
IN ACEH
Year entered into
production sharing agreement with Pertamina (Indonesian state oil company):
1968
Discovery of largest
liquid natural gas (LNG) field in the world: 1971
LNG first exported:
1978
Creation of PT Arun as joint venture between Mobil Oil
Indonesia (MOI) and Pertamina (P), and Japanese-Indonesia LNG Co (J-I NLG
Co.).:
Ownership of PT Arun:
Pertamina::55%; MOI::30%; J-I NLG Co.::15%
Revenues from PT Arun:
In the early 1990s 25% of ExxonMobil's global revenues[181]
Revenues in 2000 of PT
Arun: $1.7 billion.[182]
Profit sharing between
ExxonMobil and Pertamina: 30% (EM)::70% (P)[183]
ExxonMobil's
contract with Pertamina dates from the era of former dictator Suharto, and
gives the U.S. company the right to operate the field and get 30% of revenues
from gas sales. Pertamina gets 70% of revenues under the profit-sharing
arrangement.[184]
FOOTNOTES
[1] Hendardi, founder and director of Legal Aid Indonesia at the inaugural conference for the Indonesian Human Rights Network in Washington, D.C. February 28, 2001.
[2] "The horror of Aceh, the day the soldiers came", Lindsay Murdoch, theage.com.au, May 14, 2001.
[3] Worse to Come, John MacBeth, Syamsul Indrapatra, Nate Thayer, and Bertil Lintner, Far Eastern Economic Review, July 29, 1999.
[4] see Report on Human Rights Abuses in November 2000 issued by Kontras-Aceh.
[5] Military proposes observers for Aceh, Don Greenlees, The Australian, May 17, 2001. Confirmed by Munir of Legal Aid Indonesia and KONTRAS, in discussions with the author in November 2000.
[6] see "Recommendations of the Conference" on file with the International Forum for Aceh
[7] see letter by over 30 prominent United States human rights and religious NGOs to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell regarding an international tribunal for East Timor.
[8] Shihab to convince US of Aceh peace actions, The Indonesian Observer, May 16, 2001. Citing an attempt, in early May 2001, to smuggle " thousands of firearms, bombs, grenades, landmines and bullets to Aceh" from Thailand in which members of the Thai military were implicated .
[9] Opinion: ASEAN must solve arms trafficking, Rizal Sukma, The Jakarta Post, May 19, 2001
[10] Thailand cracks down on arms for Aceh, Anthony Davis, Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1, 2001. Although JIR is at times sloppy with its reporting, these figures seem reliable given that a source is cited.
[11] Southeast Asia piracy runs rampant, Coastal states at loggerheads over protection, Mark J. Valencia, The Washington Times, June 4, 2001
[12] Indonesia Arrests 139 Suspected Acehnese Rebels, Associated Press May 31, 2001
[13] ASA 21/013/2001 88/01News Release Issued by the
International Secretariat of Amnesty International, 17 May 2001
[14] Ibid.
[15] FID Has Nine Generals On Its List Of Xmas Bombing Suspects, Blontank Poer, Detikworld, January 16, 2001
[16] Aceh: Why Military Force Won't Bring Lasting Peace, The International Crisis Group, ICG Asia Report No. 17, 12 June 2001 (Jakarta/Brussels).
[17] Indonesia: Why Aceh is Exploding - A Human Rights Watch Press Backgrounder, Human Rights Watch, August 27, 1999, New York.
[18] Pertamina threatens to take over Arun operation, The Jakarta Post, June 9, 2001.
[19] Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control, ICG Asia Report #9, International Crisis Group, (Banda Aceh/Jakarta/Brussels), 7 December, 2000. Pgs. 18. Reporting that it is an "open secret" that the military is involved in these illegal enterprises.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid. pg. 20.
[22] Aceh: ecological war zone, Down to Earth No. 47, Down to Earth, November 2000.
[23] Opcit. ICG Asia Report No. 17, Pg. 13-14.
[24] Ibid. Pg. 17-19.
[25] Keynote address for Congerence on "Towards Democracy in Indonesia: Seize New Zealand Suharto Assets" at the Conference Centre of the University of Auckland on Saturday, April 1, 2000.
[26] Rebels ask companies to leave province until independence, Chris McCall, South China Morning Post, January 3, 2001
[27] Opcit. ICG Asia Report No. 17, Pg. 13.
[28] Peduli HAM providing one of the most conservative estimates, reported that 144 people were killed from May 1 to June 5, 2001, including 102 non-combatants. This represents a dramatic increase to the seventeen (17) murders in June 2000.
[29] President Bush has recently announced his desire to restore "closer ties" with the Indonesian military. U.S. to Restore Indonesia Military Contacts; Policy: Bush officials say decision is aimed at regaining influence with the Asian nation's forces at a time of growing political turmoil there. Jim Mann, Los Angeles Times, June 15, 2001.
[30] "Soldiers bash reporters in strife-torn province", Lindsay Murdoch and agencies, Sydney Morning Herald on May 15, 2001.
[31] Indonesia's Perils, Editorial, Washington Post, June 1, 2001
* Prepared by Robert Jereski, Executive Director, International Forum for Aceh, May 27, 2001.
** . see Appendix B
*** see Appendix B
[1] Quoted in Down-to-Earth Newsletter, Down to Earth, February, 2001..
[2] Exxon's Indonesian Exit Could Have Been Avoided, Patrick Smith, Bloomberg, March 25, 2001.
[3] "How Staying the course benefits others", Op-ed piece, undated.
[4] "What Did Mobil Know?", Michael Shari, Pete Engardio, and Sheri Prasso, BusinessWeek, December 28, 1998; The Boston Globe, December 26, 1998
[5] Ibid. Shari. See also Tim Kell's, "The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion - 1989-1992Cornell University, 1995, which claims that, in 1991, insurgent activity reached a peak, "with most incidents occurring in areas around the Lhokseumawe industrial zone" where ExxonMobil (Mobil, at the time) had much of its activities. Pg. 72.
[6] Ibid. Shari
[7] "Indonesia Sends Troops To Aceh To Defend US Co's Facilities", Associated Press, March 17, 2001. Quoting the top security minister of Indonesia as stating that "(i)f ExxonMobil demands that there should be made 100 percent sure that there be no intimidation or threat from the GAM towards workers, I think, that can be well arranged".
[8] "Memorandum - New Military Operations In Aceh Must Be Stopped", Tapol, 26 March 2001.
[9] Opcit. ICG Asia Report #9, pg. 15, 18. Citing "widespread perception that elements in the military might be encouraging violent incidents in order to strengthen their case for the application of emergency law" and claiming that "violent incidents continued to take place which, according to some observers, may have been provoked by elements of the military in order to sabotage (a cease-fire) agreement".
[10] Ibid.
[11] Dr. Karim D. Crow, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 20, no. 1, 2000.
[12] Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control, ICG Asia Report #9, International Crisis Group, (Banda Aceh/Jakarta/Brussels), 7 December, 2000. Pgs. 18. Reporting that it is an "open secret" that the military is involved in these illegal enterprises.
[13] Ibid. pg. 20.
[14] "Violence at Multinationals - When Will the Violence Stop?", Mardiyah Chamim, Zainal Bakri (Lhokseumawe), Mohammad Khafid (Mataram), Jupernalis Samosir (Riau) and Dewi Rina (Jakarta)/SZ TEMPO Magazine, March 20 - 26, 2001.
[15] "Soldiers bash reporters in strife-torn province", Lindsay Murdoch and agencies, Sydney Morning Herald, May 15, 2001.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Indonesia Complex Emergency Situation Report #1 (FY) 2001, United States Agency for International Development, May 15, 2001.
[18] "Fresh bout of violence kills three in Aceh", The Jakarta Post, May 6, 2001.
[19] "Indonesia Troops "Fired Blindly" At Aceh Children - Witness", Associated Press, April 18,2001.
[20] See "After Ogoniland, Will It Be The Turn of Aceh? Notes on Environmental Degradation and Human Rights Violations in Aceh", George Aditjondro, February, 1997 for details of inadequate compensation for industrial pollution from ExxonMobil activities by Indonesian courts as well as for more accounts of complicity by ExxonMobil for human rights violations in Aceh.
[21] "When Big Oil Gets Too Slick, Mike France, BusinessWeek, April 9, 2001.
[22] Ibid. italics mine
[23] Ibid.
[24] Department of State Human Rights Reports for 2000, U.S. Department of State, 2001.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Title: Overview, Human Rights Country Reports, 1993, U.S. Department of State, January 31, 1994.
[36] Indonesia Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 1997.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Indonesia Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, January 30, 1998.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Indonesia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, February 26, 1999.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Sec. 737. Sense of Congress Regarding Human Rights Violations in West Papua and Aceh, Including the Murder of Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, and Escalating Violence in Maluku and Central Kalimantan, U.S. Congressional Findings and Positions re: Human Rights Violations and Escalating Violence in Indonesia, May 22, 2001.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Press Release, UN Rights Experts Call on Indonesia to Probe Abuse Allegations and Protect Aceh Population, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 22 November 2000.
[61] Opcit. U.S. Department of State, 1999.
[62] UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, 1992 report.
[63] Ibid., pg. 18.
[64] A Reign of Terror - Human Rights Violations in Aceh, 1998-2000, TAPOL, March, 2000. Pg. 25.
[65] Ibid., pg. 1.
[66] Ibid., pg. 3.
[67] Ibid., pg. 1.
[68] Ibid., pg. 5.
[69] Ibid., pg. 7.
[70] Ibid., pg. 7.
[71] Ibid., pg. 15.
[72] Ibid., pg. 7.
[73] Ibid., pg. 8 and pg. 14.
[74] Ibid., pg. 10.
[75] Ibid., pg. 10.
[76] Ibid., pg. 11.
[77] Ibid., pg. 11.
[78] Ibid., pg. 19.
[79] Ibid., pg. 20.
[80] Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Indonesia chapter, Human Rights Watch World Report 2001.
[81] Joint Statement Amnesty International, Human Rights watch ASA 21/073/2000; 232/00, News Release Issued by the International Secretariat of Amnesty International, 8 December 2000.
[82] Indonesia: More Murders of
Human Rights Monitors in Aceh, Human Rights Watch, New York, March 30, 2001.
[83] Item 11 - Civil and
political rights: Colombia and Indonesia, Human Rights Watch Oral Intervention
at the 57th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights Geneva, April 4, 2001.
[84] "Indonesia: Aid Workers Executed in Aceh", Joint Statement by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, New York, December 8, 2000; and "Horror on oil islands revealed", Antony Barnett, The Observer [UK], Sunday December 17, 2000
[85] Joint Statement, Indonesia: Aceh Situation Worsening, Human Rights Groups Warn, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, New York, September 25, 2000.
[86] Aceh: Conditions for Long-Term Peace, Human Rights Watch, New York, May 12, 2000.
[87] Indonesia: Why Aceh is Exploding - A Human Rights Watch Press Backgrounder, Human Rights Watch, August 27, 1999, New York. This view is also found in Tim Kell's in which he quotes an earlier Asia Watch report, "Human Rights Abuses in Aceh", stating "(a)lthough the separatists themselves are widely reported to have committed atrocities, there was 'a vast difference in scale' between the two sides in this respect." Opcit. Kell, pg. 74.
[88] Section IV: Events in Lhokseumawe, August 1998-April 1999 of Indonesia: The May 3, 1999 Killings in Aceh - A Human Rights Watch Press Backgrounder, Human Rights Watch, August 27, 1999.
[89] Ibid. Indonesia: Why Aceh is Exploding.
[90] Ibid. in Section III: Background to the Shootings.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Amnesty International and Human Rights Press Release, Indonesia: Aceh Trial - Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch Call for Full Accountability, May 17, 2000 (New York and London).
[96] Press Release, INDONESIA - Getting away with murder: Killings by the Indonesian military in Aceh, AI INDEX: ASA 21/79/99, Amnesty International, 4 August 1999 (London).
[97]
Press Release, Amnesty International, AI Index ASA 21/043/2000September 2000.
[98] Ibid.
[99] URGENT ACTION APPEAL, Amnesty International, 7 November 2000.
[100] AI Index ASA 21/004/2001 7 Amnesty International February 2001.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid.
[104] INDONESIA A cycle of violence for Aceh's children, AI-index: ASA 21/059/2000 Amnesty International, 23 November, /2000.
[105] Press Release, INDONESIA A
Briefing for Indonesia's Financial Donors, Amnesty International USA, October
12, 2000.
[106] "Shock Therapy" Restoring Order in Aceh, 1989-1993, Amnesty International, August 2, 1993.
[107] Ibid.
[108] UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, 1992 report.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Ibid.
[119] As reported in Down-to-Earth Newsletter, Down to Earth, February, 2001.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Aceh: ecological war zone, Down to Earth No. 47, Down to Earth, November 2000.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Mobil Operations In Sumatra (Indonesia) Investigated As Villagers Sue, Drillbits & Tailings, December 21, 1998.
[124] Ibid.
[125] Ibid.
[126] "Christmas bombings aim at toppling Gus Dur: Police" The Jakarta Post, January 4, 2001.
[127] LNG plant under siege, Editorial, The Jakarta Post, March 24, 2001
[128] Interview, Serambi Indonesia, October 15, 2000, pg. 3. Police Chief Rasyidi admits to admiring the ability of Hitler to colonize 'all the wary from England (sic) to Russia (sic)'
[129] Opcit. Note 16.
[130] Opcit. Shari
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Ibid.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Ibid.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Ibid.
[142] Ibid.
[143] Ibid.
[144] Ibid.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Ibid.
[148] Ibid.
[149] Exxon's Indonesian Exit Could Have Been Avoided, Patrick Smith, Bloomberg, March 25, 2001.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Ibid.
[153] Ibid.
[154] Mobil Sees Its Gas Plant Become Rallying Point for Indonesian Rebels, Jay Solomon, Wall Street Journal, September 7, 2000.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Indonesian Rebels Set Their Sights on Mobil Plant, Jay Solomon, The Asian Wall Street Journal, September 8, 2000.
[157] Ibid.
[158] Ibid.
[159] "Three Dead Samaritans", Anna Husarska, Editorials and Opinions, The Washington Post, December 27, 2000. The editorial did not mention that, prior to being executed, the stripped and beaten humanitarian workers had been brought to the security post of ExxonMobil. See testimony of survivor at hrw.org
[160] Ibid.
[161] Mobil Oil Aceh Is Being Sued By Human Rights Group "Ghost from the Past" Christopher Torchia, Associated Press , December 24, 1998.
[162] Ibid.
[163] "Soldiers Fire at US Chartered Plane", Associated Press, December 18, 2000.
[164] Local residents protest ExxonMobil over pollution, Petromindo, February 14, 2001.
[165] Ibid. Quoting an interview in 1991 with the Governor of Aceh, Ibrahim Hasan, Tim Kell (see note 86) writes that "development has occurred (in Aceh) with little regard to local social conditions (and that) growth of industry in North Aceh has brought social and cultural dislocation and discontent." Pg. 53.
[166] ExxonMobil It's the New No. 1 - Oil, Oil Everywhere, Alex Taylor, III, Fortune, April 16, 2001
[167] Ibid. Taylor
[168] The (lack of) trouble at ExxonMobil-Most profitable giant 'just gets better' - but is it real?, Lisa Sanders, CBS.MarketWatch.com, April 27, 2001
[169] Opcit. Solomon
[170] Ibid.
[171] Ibid.
[172] "How Staying the course benefits others", Op-ed piece, undated.
[173] Ibid.
[174] ExxonMobil's Gas Shutdown in Aceh Shows Unrest's Cost, Michael Schuman and Thaddeus Herrick, The Asian Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2001.
[175] Ibid.
[176] ExxonMobil says it does not declare force majeure, Petromindo, March 24, 2001.
[177] Ibid.
[178] Ibid. (upper end figure)
[179] telephone interview with Fadel Gheit, analyst at Fahnestock & Co.)
[180] News and Trends-E and SE Asia, Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections, Volume 5, issue #2 - Monday, February 07, 2000
[181] Opcit. Solomon (2000)
[182] ExxonMobil says it does not declare force majeure, Petromindo, March 24, 2001.
[183] Indonesia Blames ExxonMobil For Stopping Aceh Ops Tom Wright, Dow Jones Newswires, March 23, 2001
[184] Ibid.